Executive Summary of the Analysis of the Delaware River Basin Flexible Flow Management Plan
By Diane Tharp
North Delaware River Watershed Conservancy, LTD
Delaware Riverside Conservancy, Inc.
December 8, 2007


Overview
The Delaware River Basin is defined as the land encompassing the river, all of the tributaries that feed it and the tributaries that feed those bodies of water. Approximately eight million people live in the basin; 5.2 million are Pennsylvanians and 15 million depend on it for drinking and sanitary needs. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in the original Supreme Court Decision in State of New Jersey v. State of New York, 283U.S. 336 (1931), “A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure… the effort is to secure an “equitable apportionment” of these waters. The four states of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware and the federal government confirmed in Section 3.3 of the Delaware River Basin Compact in 1961 that the waters of the basin were to be allocated in accordance with the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Since the three devastating floods of 2004, 2005 and 2006, attention has focused on the mismanagement by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“NYCDEP”) of its reservoir system and the decisions of the Delaware River Basin Commission (“DRBC”), both past and present that have changed or modified many of the original resolutions in the Supreme Court Decree of 1954 that superceded the decree entered in 1931 following Justice Holmes” opinion. The following summary compiles the research gathered to better understand and analyze the problems associated with the flooding of the Delaware River Basin.

Concerns of Dam Safety and Imminent Danger to the Public

Scenario: Imagine a day that the New York City Delaware River reservoirs are all filled to over 100% and spilling. Torrential rain continues to fall. One of the three dams on the Delaware fails. No emergency plan is available to warn the people. Thousands try desperately to escape the wave, but die. The millions of people living in the communities directly below the dams see their communities completely disappear. Major roads and bridges are gone and will take years to replace if at all. The people downstream scramble to save their possessions with only minutes to a few hours to escape the wall of water about to descend upon them. Politicians point the fingers at one another; noticeably humbled for not heeding the warnings to provide voids and dam inspections as the citizens had requested over and over again. Neither the NYCDEP nor the DRBC admits any responsibility. However, it is too late for the thousands of lives that could have been saved if only someone had put into action a Basin-wide Flood Management Plan that offers real flood protection. This scenario sends chills up and down my spine, but even more alarming is the fact that it could come true.

Supporting Information
* The Johnstown Flood disaster (or Great Flood of 1889 as it became known locally) occurred on May 31, 1889. It was the result of the failure of the South Fork Dam situated 14 miles (23 km) upstream of the town of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, USA, made worse by several days of extremely heavy rainfall.(6- 10 inches) The dam's failure unleashed a torrent of 20 million tons of water (18.1 million cubic meters/ 4.8 billion gallons). The flood killed over 2,200 people and produced US$17 million of damage. The reservoir dams on the Delaware are holding back many times more water than the South Fork Dam. We have three dams; Pepacton: holding back 140.2 billion gallons; Cannonsville; holding back 95.7 billion gallons and Neversink: holding back 34.9 billion gallons.One of these dams failing would release 6 to 30 times more water. The devastation is unimaginable.

· These are earthen dams between 40-50 years old. In an article written by FEMA, entitled, WHY DAMS FAIL, the first reason on the list is overtopping caused by floods that exceed the capacity of the dams. We have had three floods when capacity of these dams has been listed over 100% many times; some as high as 106%! Inadequate maintenance and upkeep is also listed as a reason for dam failure. Hazard Classifications for all dams in New York are contained under Dam Safety Regulations of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations. (6NYCRR 673) Our three dams have the highest hazard classification of Class “C” dams defined as dams that are located in areas where failure may cause loss of human life, serious damage to homes, industrial or commercial buildings, important public utilities, main highways or railroads, and/or will cause extensive economic loss. How safe are our dams? It was reported by the Times Herald that dam inspection reports have been falsified in the past. We can not trust the NYCDEP’s inspection reports.
* The three NYC Delaware Reservoirs all connect to one reservoir through a system of tunnels. This reservoir is the Rondout located 75 miles from New York City. Even though it is in the Hudson watershed, it is considered part of the Delaware System. When the Rondout reservoir is at 100% capacity, there is no place for the water in the Delaware Reservoirs to go, except to spill into the Delaware River. This was the scenario before each of the three floods. Thus, due to NYC’s poor management, no diversions could be made to the Rondout even if it were mandated because the Rondout was already spilling causing flooding in that part of the watershed also. The entire New York City System with its 19 reservoirs and three controlled lakes when 100% full has a total storage of 580 billion gallons of water. New York City’s gross consumption is 1.1 billion gallons per day. When all their reservoirs are this full, it takes 60 days to even reduce the total capacity to 90%. In fact, if there is also frequent rainfall, they can stay at this 100% capacity for months. In this case, all people in both the Catskill and Delaware Systems are facing the risk at any instant of a devastating flood. This is the nightmare that the people of the Delaware River Basin must endure.
* The other disturbing aspect of this scenario is that when reservoirs are above capacity and spilling for months at a time, it most certainly puts greater pressure on these earthen dams as well as causing erosion . I have applied for inspection reports for the three Delaware Dams under the Freedom of Information Act, but thus far I have only received some visual inspection reports from the NYCDEC dated May, 2006. In these reports the following terms are noted: internal cracking, beaching erosion, rebars are exposed; holes along the downstream face of the embankment, minor surface erosion, wet area at toe, seepage, erosion at several of the catch basins on the berms and maintenance deficiencies. How serious are these deficiencies? What do the full inspection reports tell us about our dams? We have a right to know!

* In addition, the NYCDEP has just recently been involved in a” near disaster” at a dam on their Catskill side; even more reason to give us major cause for concern. The Gilboa Dam is located east of the Hudson at the Schoharie Reservoir.
“As part of a comprehensive program to assess the condition at reservoirs in the Catskill/Delaware watershed, an engineering evaluation in 2005 showed that the Gilboa Dam did not meet the state criteria and could potentially become unstable in an extremely large flood. Assumptions that were made in the original design and construction of the dam were found to be outmoded and did not apply to dams built today.”(NYCDEP)
In 2005, the Gilboa Dam was in such disrepair that emergency measures were taken immediately to install siphons capable of removing 500 million gallons per day and 80 anchoring cables were placed through holes drilled into solid bedrock. Other upgrades included automatic monitoring of snow pack, computer monitoring of stream gauges and intake gauges, 24 hour surveillance lighting, video and electronic monitoring. (Are our dams monitored?)Then beginning next year a $300 million dollar full scale reconstruction of the dam will begin to install flood gates and release works at the base of the dam that will exceed State guidelines for capacity to release water downstream. Why aren’t these modifications also being done on the Delaware Dams?

* In a letter from Deputy Director of Civil Works U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, in 2005, Steven Stockton states that” several mayors of downstream municipalities have expressed concern regarding the efforts of NYCDEP to ensure the dam’s safety (Gilboa Dam) and requested that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers coordinate with the NYCDEP to provide expert assistance in resolution of the problem.” The Army Corps of Engineers have agreed to help in this Gilboa Dam Project. The people in their own state do not trust the NYCDEP to complete this project correctly! Why should we be asked to trust them?

* Most importantly this Gilboa Dam Project Report contains a very important part-AN EMERGENCY FLOOD ACTION PLAN)“The summary of this EAP (1) identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies preplanned actions to be followed to minimize property damage and loss of life; (2) specifies recommended actions the NYCDEP should take to moderate or alleviate the problems at the dam;(3) contains procedures and information to assist the NYCDEP in issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible downstream emergency management authorities;(4) contains inundations maps to show emergency management of authorities critical areas for action in case of emergency.” Aren’t these the exact things that we need at our dams?
Where are the Flood Emergency Action Plans for the Cannonsville, Pepacton and Neversink?



Criticism
The Supreme Court Decree gives the right of inspection to any of the Decree Parties. Pennsylvania needs to insist on the inspection of these dams. We can not wait until it is too late and the dams fail. Even more alarming is that this FFMP does not contain a Basin-wide Emergency Flood Management Plan. How can municipalities prepare for floods if the DRBC has no coordinated plan for the entire Delaware River Basin? How can the DRBC justify to the millions of people living in the path of destruction from a dam failure, that they simply did not care enough to have an EAP? (Emergency Action Plan). How can the DECREE PARTIES sign a plan that does not protect the people of their states?



Failing Infrastructure/Filtration Avoidance/Necessity for Voids

Statement: Certainly, another concern that directly affects the safety of the people of the Delaware River Basin is the NYCDEP’s failing infrastructure of its entire reservoir system. The DRBC admits that under the current dam structure that releases and diversions cannot be made quickly enough to create voids before an impending storm. However, there is much more alarming information about the New York City Reservoir System. If the Delaware Aqueduct collapses; not only will the City cut its water supply in half, but the water in our reservoirs will constantly spill into the Delaware because it will have no other outlet. Again, this will jeopardize the safety of our dams.


Supporting Information
* The Audit report of the Office of the New York State Comptroller, Thomas P. Di Napoli dated August 15, 2007 demonstrates unequivocally the necessity for an interim plan that creates voids in the Delaware River Basin Reservoirs. The purpose of the audit was to determine if the NYCDEP monitored the extent and nature of the leaks in the Delaware Aqueduct System; initiated repair of the leaks and established a plan in the event of a sudden and unexpected loss of water from the system (collapse of the tunnel). The audit found that even though the leak was discovered 18 years ago, NYCDEP did not monitor according to the recommendations; did not have a formal plan to begin the repair of the leaks; and has not established an emergency plan to ensure the safety and welfare of the people and communities involved. This report’s findings puts the Delaware River Basin in eminent danger for loss of property and lives during storm events and it now becomes imperative that voids be maintained at all reservoirs.(See complete Audit Report).

* The segment of the Delaware Aqueduct carrying water from the Rondout Reservoir to West Branch Reservoir passes under the Hudson River at Chelsea, NY. Shaft #6 of the Delaware Aqueduct was designed as a tunnel blow-off and dewatering shaft. This shaft can be used to divert water directly into the Hudson. Also at this Chelsea pumping station 100-300mgd can be pumped directly from the Hudson in case of drought. It was used in 1989 for NY City to supplement its water supply. Even though the leak was discovered in 1988 and the NYCDEP knew that they would need Shaft # 6 to dewater the aqueduct, they apparently allowed it to become in disrepair because in this audit report, Emily Lloyd NYCDEP Commissioner states that, ‘we are about to award a contract for 239 million for the first piece of the repair; the rehabilitation of Shaft #6.”. Until Shaft # 6 is completely repaired, voids must be maintained in all reservoirs because we have no means for emergency diversions into the Hudson.
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* In an Article entitled, Finger in the Dike, Head in the Sand; DEP’s Crumbling Water Supply Infrastructure by River keeper, Inc: even more shocking detail is given about the leaks and the impending disaster awaiting. Also an article entitled, City of Water by David Grann tells of the antiquated maze of tunnels and mentions the Delaware Aqueduct’s leak that is creating massive sinkholes in Ulster and Orange Counties. Both articles are a must read for the understanding of the City’s failing infrastructure.

* New York City has refused to back up its water supply system by building a water filtration plant on the Hudson in case the water system would become polluted, a severe drought does occur or the failing infrastructure collapses. The EPA has just granted them an unbelievable ten year extension on the filtration avoidance which I find to be quite suspicious. The state health department of New York has just declared on June 8th of this year that the town of Newburgh which takes water directly from the Delaware Aqueduct (water coming directly from the Rondout) must build a filtration plant. (Times Herald Record). Pregnant woman have been asked to consult their doctors before drinking. If this water coming directly from the Delaware System must be filtered then certainly the water from the Delaware System that eventually mixes in the reservoirs (Kensico and West Branch) close to New York which has had pollution problems for years due to the extensive development most certainly must be filtered. The EPA has already ordered NYC to build a filtration system on the Croton Reservoir System. They are being fined $30,000 per day for their lack of compliance with the agreed upon schedule. Exactly what data did the EPA use to support this ten year extension? How can we trust the NYCDEP when in the last two years three employees have been federally indicted for falsifying drinking water monitoring records? (Times Herald Record; June 6). This EPA decision was a definite set back to our fight for voids and flood control. If NY City were required to build a filtration plant on the Hudson, it would allow them to have a back up drinking water supply during drought and would make it possible for our reservoirs to have voids.
* A recent decision by the federal court of appeals in Washington DC may compel New York City to build a filtration plant to treat the water coming from the City’s Delaware reservoirs. In 2006 the federal EPA adopted a regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act requiring all existing drinking water supply systems using surface water reservoirs to cover each reservoir and treat the water flowing into the reservoir or to treat all of the water flowing out of the reservoir before it reaches water users. New York City joined in a lawsuit filed by the City of Portland, Oregon challenging EPA’s rule. Last month, the two cities lost their challenge. Unless the City can convince the U.S. Supreme Court to review this case, the federal regulations should compel the City to treat all the water coming from all of its reservoirs, including the Croton system and Catskill system as well as the Delaware system reservoirs.

Criticism
The NYCDEP’s arrogant and negligent attitude is placing the people of the Delaware River Basin in an “unsafe” environment by not creating voids in their reservoirs or making these dams flood control dams. Spilling reservoirs cause millions of dollars of additional damage to homes and businesses that would have been spared had they not spilled and instead contain voids.

· In the FFMP released in February, the words additional storage for the reservoirs was stated eight times with the understanding that New York City would indeed be allowed to add this additional storage as long as they provided a “feasible plan.” without any concern for safety of the people below these dams. The NYCDEP is not able to manage their present storage in a responsible manner without spilling billions of gallons of water into the Delaware during a storm event. The present FFMP includes the concept of additional storage under the Reassessment Study section of the FFMP.
Criticism
The Reassessment Study does not mention that an EIS (Environmental Impact Study) should be conducted concerning the additional storage in any or all of the reservoirs and the effect of the current release schedule on flood mitigation, fisheries management, and overall ecological protection of the River System. This reassessment study will take at least three years. Until this study is completed, the DRBC must negotiate with the decree parties to provide a more aggressive release schedule to protect us from the “next” devastating flood.

Justification for Flood Control

Statement: We have had three years of public outcry; an interim plan that has proved ineffective; a four state governor’s task force with recommendations for change; hundreds of comments for changes on the previously proposed FFMP; letters from both federal and state politicians; hundreds of newspaper articles written on the subject; millions of dollars of damages to residences and businesses and loss of life. Yet, this FFMP does not contain a Basin-wide Flood Management Plan.

Supporting Information:

· The Delaware River Basin Compact contains language directly relating to flood control and grants the DRBC the authority to enact measures for flood control.

“Whereas the public interest requires facilities must be ready and operative when needed, to avoid the catastrophe of unexpected floods, of prolonged drought, and for other purposes.”(Part I-Compact)

“The commission may plan, design, construct and operate and maintain projects and facilities, as it may deem necessary or desirable for flood damage reduction. It shall have the power to operate such facilities and to store and release waters on the Delaware River and its tributaries and elsewhere within the basin, in such a manner, at such times, and under such regulations as the commission may deem appropriate to meet flood conditions as they may arise.” (Article 6.1 Flood Protection-)

The Commission…, that after consultation with the river master under said decree may find and declare a state of emergency resulting from drought or catastrophe and it may thereupon by unanimous consent of its members authorize and direct an increase or decrease in any allocation or diversion permitted or releases required by the decree, in such a manner and in such limited time as may be necessary to meet such an emergency condition. (Article 3.3- Delaware River Basin Compact.)

Criticism:
Before the three floods, the DRBC did not negotiate to institute an accelerated release schedule from the reservoirs into the Delaware nor did the NYCDEP divert any extra water into their Hudson System. Between January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2006, the reservoirs never fell below 90%.During the entire month of June the three reservoirs were collectively over 100%. Yet, after two devastating floods in 2004 and 2005, no one acted during those six months to do anything to reduce the crests of the floods. So on June 29th, we had the third flood, even more devastating than the previous two.


· On September 21, 2006 a letter was sent to the DRBC signed by the four governors requesting the DRBC “to develop a set of recommended measures to alleviate and mitigate flooding impacts along the Delaware and its tributaries. We direct that the measures to be evaluated by the task force include the development of a basin-wide flood management operating plan for the basin’s existing reservoirs.”

· The Task Force developed a Preliminary Action Plan that listed 45 recommendations in six categories. Recommendation R-2 explicitly states” to develop a reservoir operation plan that includes potential flood mitigation by all major reservoirs. Recommendation R-3 asked that discharge mitigation plans be evaluated and the maximum rate at which reservoirs can be lowered prior to a storm event be evaluated.

Criticism
The DRBC published the draft of its proposed FFMP signed by all decree parties and New York City (Feb.26, 2007) before public comment had even finished on the Preliminary Action Plan of the Task Force (Feb. 27, 2007) and months before the Governor’s received the Task Force Report from the DRBC (July 12, 2007) Why would the Governors of the four states approve of a document before receiving the information from the Task Force that they themselves had commissioned the DRBC to form? Why would the DRBC present a plan that did not take into consideration the recommendations of this Task Force? Why wasn’t the Task Force given the opportunity to analyze this plan? Why didn’t the DRBC inform these Task Force members that the plan existed?

* In Carol Colliers’ Cover Letter of the Task Force Preliminary Action Plan to the Governors on July 12, 2007, she states that the following immediate actions are proposed: Develop a coordinated reservoir operating plan. (R-2.) If this was to be an immediate action, why isn’t this part of the FFMP?

* The Delaware River Basin Water Code was adopted in April 2001 before the devastating three floods. A resolution adopting a new Water Resources Plan for the Delaware River Basin was adopted on September 13, 2007 ironically, one week before the 2004 flood. Three goals are listed for Water Corridor Management. 2.1 states: Prevent or minimize flood-induced loss of life and property.


Criticism
The FFMP does not have a basin-wide coordinated reservoir plan for flood mitigation as requested by the governors and as stated by the DRBC in the above passages. A release schedule is not a Flood Mitigation Plan!

* . There is another reservoir on the Delaware River System that has also played an important role in releases of excessive water into the Delaware River increasing the height of the crests. PPL’s Lake Wallenpaupack has been under fire from local officials and residents also for causing increased flooding during the last three floods. Of major concern since the relicensing of Lake Wallenpaupack by FERC on July 8, 2005, under Section 10 of the settlement agreement the new target lake levels would be higher than current target levels. This is in collaboration with the DRBC and the Upper Delaware River Basin for drought conditions. The use of water from Lake Wallenpaupack to meet the Montague target of 1750 cfs results in even fewer releases by the NYC reservoirs. This not only allows the reservoirs to keep even more water, but provides for major concerns for the fishing habitats that depend on these cold water releases for survival. I will address the fishing issue in a moment. The Pike County Commissioners have written letters to FERC concerning the lack of any flood control elements in the Relicensing Settlement. Since Lake Wallenpaupack is now linked to the reservoirs by virtue of this relicensing, the DRBC must include in their new plan a comprehensive flood plan from PPL including voids. When Lake Wallenpaupack opens their flood gates for emergency spills when the river is already swollen and flooding it adds feet to the crest of the water. During last year’s flood, Lake Wallenpaupack was releasing over 8000cfs through its flood gates. To better understand how much water this is; it would be as if 32 Olympic size pools were emptying every minute. I do know that the Lake Wallenpaupack Advisory Committee has been working on a plan to avoid this type of catastrophic releases, but this plan must be included in the new Flexible Flow Management Plan and must be one that protects the people living downstream from this dam. All reservoirs along the Delaware need to have voids to help reduce flooding.


Equitable Apportionment

Statement: By Supreme Court Decree, the DRBC is responsible for the “equitable apportionment:” of waters among the four states.

Supporting Information:
· It was not the intention of the Delaware River Basin Compact for the DRBC to be responsible for NYC Water Supply, but for the “equitable apportionment” of water among the decree parties.
· In order to ensure that “equitable apportionment would be applied in the future, PA was adamant that language was included in the Supreme Court Decree of 1954 that would guarantee the opportunity to make these changes in the future. ”The fact that a party to this cause has not filed exception to the report of the Special Master or to the provisions of this decree shall not estop such a party at any time in the future from applying for a modification of the provisions of this decree.(Supreme Court Decree: Section X)
· In the Report of the Special Master Filed May 27, 1954 recommending the Amended Decree, it further states” New York takes the risk of the future… and the possible experiences of the future may make modification of the plan as it now stands necessary in unforeseen particulars.”(sec 2.05) .
· The NJDEP’ Preliminary Assessment of NY City’s Safe Yields indicates that current operating plans of the NYC Reservoirs are not based on the actual and current data, thus contributing to the “unequal apportionment of water”
· Releases from the NY City Delaware Reservoirs are controlled by the unanimous decision of the four decree party states and New York City. Thus, if New York City refuses to agree, the resolution cannot be passed or instead, as in the past, the resolutions are written so New York City will agree. Diversions from these reservoirs to the Hudson System are controlled exclusively by New York City. Therefore the reality is that New York City controls the releases and diversions of our Delaware River. Certainly not “equitable apportionment”
· The Decree states that “no diversion herein allowed shall constitute a prior appropriation of the waters of the Delaware River or confer any superiority of right upon any party hereto in respect of the use of the waters. (Section: VIII) Thus, New York’s water supply should not take preference over the needs of the other three states; in this case, for flood control and the preservation of the ecology of the river.

Criticism: Even after three major main stem floods, the NYCDEP continues to manage their reservoirs in such a way that is inconsistent with the term” equitable apportionment “of waters spilling billions of gallons of water into our river system. NY City is both failing to prevent flooding and by its actions, is increasing the likelihood of flooding. Pennsylvania has not exercised their right given to them in the Supreme Court Decree to challenge the decisions of the DRBC and the NYCDEP to protect the lives and communities in the Commonwealth.

Scientific vs. Unscientific Data

Statement: USING INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE DATA LEADS TO FALSE CONCLUSIONS.
* The drought designation is not based on scientific data. The definitions in the NYCDEP Drought Plan are as follows; A Drought Watch is declared when there is less than a 50% probability that either of the two largest reservoir systems, the Delaware(Cannonsville,Neversink,Pepacton,and Rondout) or the Catskill(Ashokan, Schoharie) will fill by June 1- the start of the water year. A drought Warning is declared when there is less than a 33 1/3% probability and Drought Emergency is declared when there is a reasonable probability that the reservoirs will be drained.

Criticism-
When the drought curve is based on probabilities and not the actual capacity of the reservoirs, there are less releases and the possibility of 100% full reservoirs.

* The DRBC has stated that if a 20% void (54 BG) had been in effect in May 2001, the reservoirs would have been nearly empty by December 15 because they were at 23.4% capacity or 63.348 BG. The NYCDEP lists the total capacity of their reservoir system at 44.4% at this same time. ( 255 billion gallons – enough for over 200 days of consumption) The Delaware Reservoirs are listed on December 17, 2001 as Pepacton-33.1%; Cannonsville-5.3% and Neversink- 35.1% for a total of 23.6% Why did the NYCDEP overdraft the Cannonsville Reservoir endangering the ecological balance of the West Branch of the Delaware? Where is the “equitable apportionment” of waters?

* In the Report of the Special Master recommending the Decree of 1954, it is stated,” The City contends that a most important aspect of the plan and formula (Montague) is its influence in severe periods of drought. The minimum or permanent volume of storage required for release, regardless of the consumption demand is 85 billion gallons of storage. (Kennison, 260-Chief Engineer, New York City Board of Water Supply; p.77) Even though this is not written in the Decree, this was the testimony on which the Supreme Court based its decision to grant in favor of NY City’s diversions.
* It was also assumed by the Special Master when issuing the Supreme Court Decree of 1954, that the Montague Formula of 1750 cfs was a permanent amount regardless of drought. Many pages of testimony by New York City “contend that the Montague Formula contains several valuable features. First, a basic rate of flow at Montague which will have a permanent stabilizing effect upon the lower river.” Releases to the lower river will be made principally during periods in the summer and fall.”(Special Master’ Report pages 74-75) Little or no excess releases are made in the present plan during the summer months unless the reservoirs are spilling.



Criticism
The intention of the Supreme Court Decree was that the Delaware remain a free flowing river and that the Montague formula of 1,750 was to be a permanent minimum amount of flow even during drought. Excess releases were to be made into the river based on NY City’s safe yield and consumption and they were to be released in 120 days commencing on June 1. Due to the severe drought in the 1960s resolutions passed by the DRBC since the decree have completely changed the excess release formula and have even changed the Montague flow during drought emergency to as low as 1100cfs endangering the water supply of those who depend on the Delaware for this water supply. During drought the NYCDEP should be required to have an “equitable” withdrawal from each of the reservoirs and even during drought the Montague Formula of 1,750 cfs should remain the same as was the Supreme Court’s intention; thus, forcing the NYCDEP to use the Hudson for its additional water.
* Between June 26- June 30, 2006 over 85 billion gallons of water spilled into the Delaware from the three reservoirs. To put this into perspective, 8.5 billion gallons would cover a NFL football field to a depth of 19,798 Ft. (a height of nearly 14 Empire State Buildings or 3.7 miles high.)( Source DRBC Water Resources Plan MAP) Now multiply this by 10 and you have a volume of water 37 miles high by 100 yards dumping into the river in 4 days!
Criticism:
Unbelievably, the DRBC originally stated that this amount of water only made the difference of inches. However, several scientists have disputed these findings.

* The NWS/NOAA in their Reservoir Simulation for the June Flood (second run) concluded that there would be a difference between 1.8 feet to 10.5 feet above the Montague Gauge if the reservoirs had not spilled and this did not include the Neversink or Lake Wallenpaupack Reservoirs.

* Roger Ruggles Ph.D., P.E. concludes that there would have been a difference of at least 6 feet at Montague if reservoirs had contained a 20% void. The peak average daily flow at Montague, NJ could have been decreased by as much as 20% for the 2004 flood, 22% for the 2005 flood and 33% for the 2006 flood.

Criticism:

Why didn’t any or all of the four decree states commission their own State’s expert hydrologists to do a study of the effect of the reservoirs?

* The Preliminary Action Plan of the Flood Mitigation Task Force recommends (R-1) that a new flood analysis model be developed because the Oasis Model which this FFMP is based upon has proven ineffective for complex modeling of storm events. The governors have appropriated $500,000.00 to develop this flood analysis tool and the DRBC has begun to work on this.

Criticism:
It is imperative that this modeling tool be developed before this FFMP is passed by the DRBC in May. How can we adopt a release schedule that is not based on the most accurate and complete analysis tools? The lives of all people that live in the Delaware River Basin are in jeopardy

* It is stated in the FFMP that during the period October 1- April 30, fifty percent of the water equivalent of the snow pack in the watersheds above the reservoirs shall be included in the determination of combined and individual reservoir usable storage.
Criticism:

100 % of the snow pack should be included, not 50% and a specific chart needs to be included to calculate this amount. In 2005, the NYCDEP had agreed to release water from the Pepacton in order to maintain a void in the reservoir equal to 50% of the water equivalent of any existing snow pack. This continued until March 31, 2005. Yet, on April 1, the Pepacton was over 100% full because it rained that week and on April 1st we had the devastating 2005 flood. So apparently this formula does not work. Also, when there is consistent rainfall, additional releases must be added to the release schedule to prohibit the reservoirs from spilling. No one takes into consideration this very important fact: when it rains not only are the reservoirs filling from the rainfall, but because of the natural run-off into the river making the river rise, the reservoirs have no directed releases to fulfill the Montague target; thus, the reservoirs rise even more. The present release schedule must be accelerated during rainy times or we again will experience another flood. One billion gallons of water can be voided by releasing 1600cfs in 24 hours.


· Scientifically, it is of utmost importance to have the most current data. By Supreme Court Decree, the River Master is to file a report to the Supreme Court with a copy to each governor not less than annually. Yet, in 2006, the report that was filed was for the year 2002. Incredibly, the River Master is 5 years behind in filing his reports. How is this possible? The 2002 report is an in depth report with over 25 graphs and charts. It is a “report card” of the status and health of the Delaware River. As a teacher, I would be fired for not providing “report cards” for my students. Executives would be fired for not providing their annual reports to their companies or investors. How can the River Master simply not comply with a Supreme Court directive?



Criticism
If these reports were available for 2004, 2005 and 2006, the information could be used to further analyze the impact of the reservoirs on the main stem Delaware as well as formulate a more accurate release schedule. Why haven’t the governors questioned the missing reports? Why hasn’t the DRBC demanded that the River Master follow the Supreme Court Decree in filing these reports? What data was used for the present flood analysis tool if these reports are not available?

· A Map published by the NYCDEP, Orange County Water Authority shows the water flow following a catastrophic failure of the Neversink Dam. Nearest the dam at the Woodbourne Area, the wall of water would be catastrophic destroying everything in its path and arriving in only 35 minutes. The flow would be as much as 1, 830,000 cfs. at this area. Also according to this map at Port Jervis, the flow would be 134,000cfs. Incredibly, the flow at the crest of the 2006 flood at Port Jervis was 180,000 cfs more than if the Neversink Dam had failed .At Montague we had a peak flow of 212,000 cfs and at Trenton an even more remarkable 237,000 cfs. The three spilling reservoirs contributed as much water into the Delaware as if the Neversink had failed. This is astounding!

· Much of the data on the River Master’s website comes directly from the NYCDEP. How accurate is this data? The Task Force recommends that data be collected by other sources and a more effective method of data collection and sharing be considered.
· Who are the authors of the FFMP document? Was it written by engineers and hydrologists from the Decree Parties? This document will change the lives of millions. We deserve to know the qualifications of those who authored it!
Criticism:
The FFMP must be subject to the review of experts in the field through an environmental impact study. It must use the latest modeling tools as well as current data. It is time to base this plan on real science so that true and reliable conclusions can be reached.

Conclusion

This summary sets forth a valid argument necessitating the need for flood control for the millions of people that live in the Delaware River Basin. In my research I have used the information provided by the websites of the NYCDEP and the DRBC as well as government documents in an attempt to analyze the problem using the most accurate data available. We need a Flood Management Plan that gives the people of this Delaware River Basin the peace of mind so they will know that the river will not flood every time there is five inches of rain... Reservoirs that contain voids will mitigate or lower flood crests during excess rainfall events. I believe that the data available will prove this. The DRBC states that excessive rainfall causes flooding and that flood plains will flood. I agree. I also agree that excessive rainfall coinciding with filled to capacity reservoirs creates a deadly scenario. Capacity filled reservoirs that spill billions of gallons of water into the river during excessive rainfall events cause higher peak flows and higher crests ultimately causing flooding in the main stem river.
The DRBC admits that during two of the highest recorded rainfall events in our area in 1999(6.5 inches) and 2005(8.5 inches), there was no flood .They say it was due to many hydrologic conditions, but it was most definitely because the reservoirs had voids large enough to hold back the rainfall. Yet, in 2004( 4.5 inches), 2005( 5.5 inches) and 2006 (8.5 inches), when the reservoirs were filled to capacity and spilling, we had major flooding even though the rainfall amounts were far less than in 1955.

In my three years of research, I have uncovered a path of lies and deception by the NYCDEP. They have falsified inspection reports and refused to supply the future needs of the city by building a filtration plant on the Hudson. They have allowed their entire reservoir system to begin to crumble. Even after three floods, they continue to manage their reservoirs in an unsafe, inequitable and negligent manner. Why?

The Decree Parties have agreed to approve an FFMP that has no real Flood Protection, has no basin-wide coordinated Flood Mitigation Plan and is based on an ineffective and incomplete scientific model. Why are the states approving a plan that does not protect their citizens and communities?

The DRBC allows NYCDEP to dictate the contents of this plan under the constraint of the unanimous agreement clause in the Supreme Court Decree. Before the June 2006 flood, they did nothing to negotiate a plan to alleviate the possibility of yet, another flood. This is a negligent action. Politicians have sent many letters asking for Flood Protection for their constituents to this agency. This plan is unacceptable. If it is not changed to include the many suggestions set forth in this summary, we have no recourse but to pursue our legal options.


References

1. Supreme Court of the United States, State of New Jersey v. State of New York and City of New York, May 4,1931
2. Supreme Court of the United States, State of New Jersey v. State of New York
and City of New York, Amended Decree June 7, 1954
3. Delaware Basin Compact of 1961
4. DRBC Documents:
Water Supply Reservoirs and Flood Protection
History of the Reservoir Releases Program in the Upper Delaware Basin
PowerPoint of Public Comment on the FFMP
Resolution NO.2007-7
Reservoirs in the Delaware River Basin
NO.2006-Docket NO. D-77-20CP(revision 9)
Delaware River Basin Ware Code 2001
Proposed Flexible Flow Management Plan
NOAA Reports
5. NYCDEP Articles:
Overview of the NY City Drinking Water Supply System
Current Reservoir Levels
City to Implement Reservoir Spill Control at Gilboa Dam
Croton Filtration Plant Project
History of Drought and Water Consumption

6 .Recommendations of the Delaware River Basin Interstate Flood Mitigation Task Force.
7. Lake Wallenpaupack Documents
8. Newspaper Articles
9. Other references are included on CD entitled: Tri-State Riverside Municipalities Conference Resource Documents